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S E N T E N C I N G  L AW 
Is Supervised Release Tolled Retrospective to the Start of an  
Unrelated Detention If the Defendant Is Credited with Time Served  
Upon Sentencing for the New Offense? 
CASE AT A GLANCE  
1. In FY 2017, 94 percent of all nonimmigration cases in which the offender was sentenced to imprisonment included supervised release. U.S. 
Sentencing Commission, Overview of Federal Criminal Cases, Fiscal Year 2017 (June 2018), at 6, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-
and-publications/research-publications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf.
The district court sentenced Jason Mont for violating his supervised release conditions after a state 
conviction and sentence that credited him for time in pretrial detention served while he was on supervised 
release. Mont challenges the court’s exercise of jurisdiction, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) does not 
permit the court to reach backward to find that supervised release was tolled once he received credit 
for his pretrial detention at sentencing. Petitioner and respondent disagree about the interpretation of 
the language and structure of Section 3624(e). While the government relies heavily on the purpose of 
supervised release, petitioner notes that the district court could have prevented its jurisdiction from 
lapsing had it issued a summons or warrant prior to the end of his supervised release, as indicated in 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(i). Such summons or warrant would have allowed the court to hold the violations hearing 
even after supervised release ended. 
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INTRODUCTION
Federal courts impose supervised release upon a prison sentence 
in almost all cases.1 In this case, the Court is asked to interpret 
one sentence in 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) to determine when a term of 
supervised release might be paused. 
ISSUES
Does 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) toll a period of supervised release 
while petitioner is held in pretrial custody awaiting trial on a 
state offense when the time in detention is later credited to his 
sentence? 
FACTS
In 2005, Jason Mont was sentenced to ten years in federal prison 
after being convicted on drug charges. Subsequent sentence 
reductions led to his release on March 6, 2012, when his ive-year 
supervised release started. Almost four years into his supervised 
release term, in January 2016, Mont’s probation oficer informed 
the district court that Mont had violated his release conditions 
by testing positive for drugs and attempting to replace his urine 
sample with another liquid. In addition, state drug charges had 
been iled against him. On June 1, 2016, state authorities arrested 
Mont for cocaine traficking. He was held pretrial at a local jail. 
On October 6, 2016, he pled guilty to state charges in exchange 
for a six-year prison sentence. Mont conceded that in light of his 
state conviction, he had violated his supervised release conditions 
and requested a hearing. The district court judge wanted to hold 
the violation hearing after the state sentencing, which delayed it 
for months. The court indicated later that it issued a summons in 
November 2016, in conjunction with a then-planned hearing on 
the supervised release. 
The state court sentenced Mont to the agreed-upon six-year term 
on March 21, 2017, and credited the entire presentence time 
to that sentence. On March 30, 2017, the federal court issued a 
warrant for Mont. The hearing on the supervised release violation 
inally occurred on June 28, 2017. At that point Mont argued that 
the court lacked jurisdiction because the supervision period 
had expired on March 6, 2017. The district court summarily 
rejected the argument. According to the district court, under 18 
U.S.C. § 3583(i), its November summons allowed it to retain the 
power to sanction Mont for the supervised release violation even 
though the term had expired. It then sentenced him to 42 months 
imprisonment, to be served consecutive to his state sentence. 
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The Sixth Circuit afirmed in an unpublished opinion, available 
in the Joint Appendix, though on different grounds as it could not 
ind any documentation on the record that the summons was ever 
issued. It relied on a circuit precedent, U.S. v. Goins, 516 F.3d 416 
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 847 (2008), inding that under 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(e) supervised release paused when the defendant 
was incarcerated based on an indictment that resulted in a 
conviction and the subsequent sentence credited the defendant 
with time served. Therefore, the court had jurisdiction over the 
defendant when it issued the warrant on March 30, 2017, and at 
the time of the hearing, even without resorting to Section 3583(i). 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on 
November 2, 2018. 
CASE ANALYSIS
At issue in this case is the interpretation of one sentence in 
a supervised release provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e). Section 
3624 is entitled “Release of a prisoner”; subsection (e) is called 
“Supervision after release.” The sentence at issue notes that 
“[a] term of supervised release does not run during any period in 
which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction 
for a Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is 
for a period of less than 30 consecutive days” (emphasis added). 
Appellate courts to consider the issue have split on the question 
whether detention tolls supervised release if the supervisee is 
later convicted and sentenced, with credit given for the time in 
custody. Two federal courts—United States v. Marsh, 829 F.3d 705 
(D.C. Cir. 2016), and United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 1102 
(9th Cir. 1999)—have not allowed for such a backward-looking 
tolling while four others—Goins, United States v. Ide, 624 F.3d 666 
(4th Cir. 2010), United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 
2009), United States v. Molina-Gazca, 571 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2009)—
have found supervised release to pause under such circumstances 
during pretrial detention. 
Petitioner Mont argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
revoke his supervised release because its term had already ended 
at the time of the revocation hearing. Since the record does not 
relect that the district court issued a summons, Section 3583(i) 
is inapplicable. That provision, entitled “Delayed revocation,” 
extends the court’s power to revoke supervised release and 
sentence the offender for any violation of a condition of the 
release “beyond the expiration of the term of supervised release 
for any period reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters 
arising before its expiration, if before its expiration, a warrant or 
summons has been issued on the basis of an allegation of such a 
violation.” Petitioner concedes that had the summons been issued 
in November 2016, the district court would have had jurisdiction to 
revoke his supervised release and sentence him accordingly. 
Section 3624(e), on the other hand, does not extend the court’s 
jurisdiction in light of the language, structure, and legislative 
history of the provision. According to petitioner, the appellate 
court’s “backlip,” therefore, inappropriately tolled supervised 
release during pretrial detention when the defendant is later 
credited with time served at sentencing. Petitioner relies on 
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000), in which the 
Supreme Court interpreted Section 3624(e) in a strictly temporal 
manner. Even though Roy Lee Johnson served an excessively 
long sentence, the Court held that under the statute supervised 
release follows upon imprisonment, rather than some “ictitious or 
constructive earlier time.” Yet, the Sixth Circuit in Goins restricted 
the Johnson approach to one sentence in Section 3624(e) and 
otherwise adopted the backward-looking tolling approach. It did so 
even though the present tense used throughout the statute further 
supports a linear interpretation. The D.C. Circuit in United States 
v. Marsh, 829 F.3d 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016), focused on the word is 
whose present tense removes the possibility of a backward-looking 
method of statutory tolling. After all, the Marsh court found the 
present tense to include the future but not the past. 
Petitioner also cites rules of statutory interpretation, when applied 
to the terms in the statute, in support of his argument. Section 
3624(e)’s use of the term imprisonment indicates that Congress 
contemplated imprisonment upon conviction rather than pretrial 
detention, even if later credited to a prison term. In this argument, 
petitioner inds support in United States v. Morales-Alejo, 193 F.3d 
1102 (9th Cir. 1999). The phrase in connection with also prevents 
the application presented, despite the inding in Goins that pretrial 
detention is connected to a conviction when it is later credited to the 
sentence. Petitioner, on the other hand, deems the term connected 
solely to imprisonment for a supervised release violation. 
Petitioner sees a structural distinction between the court’s power 
to revoke supervised release and sentence the offender for any 
violation of a condition of the release between Section 3583 and 
Section 3624. He views Section 3583(i) as governing the court and 
providing it with the power to extend jurisdiction while Section 
3624(e) is a directive to the Bureau of Prisons, instructing it 
how to calculate supervised release. The district court could have 
easily established jurisdiction had it issued a summons or warrant 
prior to March 6, 2017. It is, therefore, unnecessary to strain the 
interpretation of Section 3624(e) when a judge could extend the 
time for revoking supervised release under Section 3583(i) by 
issuing a summons or warrant. The advantage of this approach 
would be to provide notice and assure certainty. 
In its reply, the government focuses extensively on the purpose of 
supervised release and the impact of detention on these goals. It 
argues that starting June 1, 2016, Mont’s detention interfered with 
his liberty and ended his transition into the community. Since the 
probation oficer could no longer effectively exercise supervision, 
supervised release terminated at that point. The government 
concedes that even if that interruption was not apparent on June 
1, it became obvious in October when Mont pled guilty to the state 
charges. The supervised release tolls no later than when the state 
court accepted the guilty plea. As the term conviction covers both 
the inding of guilt as well as the entry of a inal judgment, with 
the former, custody changes from pretrial detention to being a 
component of the penalty.
The purposes of supervised release further support this analysis. 
The government notes that lengthy incarceration during 
supervised release after all ends the transition into the community 
as it renders voluntary and afirmative compliance with the 
terms of supervised release impossible and thwarts meaningful 
supervision. That will be the case whether the sentence is served 
before or after a conviction. Either way the prison term interrupts 
the supervised release. The offender should not be credited for 
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supervised release time while he is in prison. The government 
notes prohibition against such double counting is relected in 
other statutes. 
The government also inds petitioner’s language-based arguments 
unconvincing. First, the phrase in connection with a conviction 
in Section 3624(e) is to be read broadly and is not restricted to 
imprisonment that occurs “after” a conviction but rather applies 
to any imprisonment related to a conviction. After all, any time a 
custodial term is credited against post-conviction imprisonment, 
it would be considered in connection with that conviction. Since 
the state court credited Mont with the time he served in pretrial 
detention, that incarcerative period would retrospectively be 
deemed imprisonment in connection with a conviction. 
Second, use of the present tense in Section 3624(e) does not 
invalidate this interpretation. The tolling provision applies to 
imprisonment either when it begins or when its connection to a 
conviction becomes obvious. Third, as the federal code frequently 
uses the term imprisonment to denote any form of custody or 
detention, including pretrial detention, the government argues 
there is no reason to construe it narrowly here. The term does not 
apply only to post-sentence custody. 
The government concludes that the district court had authority 
to sentence Mont for violation of the conditions of his supervised 
release because either his pretrial or, at a minimum, his post-plea 
incarceration tolled the term of his supervised release. 
SIGNIFICANCE
In 2015, Mont was one of about 115,000 federal offenders on 
supervised release, who served an average time of almost three 
years under supervision.2 Mont’s failure to complete his term 
successfully is, unfortunately, not unusual, as the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission’s data indicate. Of federal inmates released into the 
community in 2005, half were rearrested, a third reconvicted, and 
a quarter re-incarcerated within eight years. Among the most 
common serious new offenses was drug traficking.3 Even though 
many of the new offenses occur shortly after release, not all of 
them do. Mont, in fact, stayed out of trouble longer than many 
of those who reoffend. New offenses and technical violations of 
supervised release may both lead to the revocation of supervised 
release. According to the Sentencing Commission, about a third 
of those under supervision end up having their terms revoked and 
are being sent back to prison.4 
Yet, only half the circuits have confronted the question at issue 
here, whether to apply Section 3624(e) in a backward-looking 
way to toll supervised release. That may indicate the limited 
practical applicability of the issue. Perhaps it is that the timeline, 
which created part of the challenge in Mont, does not occur overly 
frequently. Perhaps federal judges are inclined to issue a summons 
or warrant while supervised release is running, as the district court 
2. The Pew Charitable Trusts, Issue Brief: Number of Offenders on Federal Supervised Release Hits All-Time High (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.pewtrusts.
org/en/research-and-analysis/issue-briefs/2017/01/number-of-offenders-on-federal-supervised-release-hits-all-time-high.
3. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Recidivism Among Federal Offenders: A Comprehensive Overview (March 2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2016/recidivism_overview.pdf.
4. U.S. Sentencing Commission, Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release (July 2010), at 62–68, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/research-publications/2010/20100722_Supervised_Release.pdf.
here asserted it had done. In light of that factual question, which the 
Sixth Circuit resolved against the district court, the government is 
asking for a remand should the Supreme Court ind for Mont. 
The government’s brief, as one would expect, is well written and 
cogently argued, but one wonders about the extensive discussion 
of the purpose of supervised release in what seems like a question 
of statutory construction. Most persuasive may be petitioner’s 
structural argument. Section 3624 seems to focus on the Bureau 
of Prisons rather than federal courts while Section 3583 directly 
addresses the district court, empowering it to adjudicate violations 
after expiration of the supervised release as long as it issued a 
warrant or summons during the supervised release period. In the 
end, a victory for Mont would allow him to be released after his 
six-year state sentence without having to return to federal prison. 
It would vindicate the D.C. and Ninth Circuits’ interpretation and 
likely head off other questions such as how to address lengthy 
pretrial detention that interrupts supervised release but is 
ultimately not credited to a future sentence. Yet, systemically, little 
change is likely except that some district courts may come to issue 
a summons or warrant more proactively, with probation oficers 
watching the clock even more closely. 
Besides Mont, the Court has another supervised release case on 
its argument schedule for February 26. United States v. Haymond 
(Docket No. 17-8995) addresses the constitutionality of a federal 
law that mandates a ive-year prison term for sex offenders who 
violate the terms of their supervised release. That case, which has 
attracted substantially more attention than Mont and has garnered 
a number of amicus briefs, raises Sixth Amendment questions in 
the context of a sentence revocation. The stakes are substantially 
higher than in Mont, and the question arises whether the Court 
plans to take on supervised release more systematically, especially 
as Mont was an unpublished opinion, with an at least ambiguous 
factual issue that could have resolved the question at issue. 
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